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South Africa
YOU REAP WHAT YOU SOW:
REGULATING MARRIAGES AND
INTIMATE PARTNERSHIPS IN A DIVERSE,
POST-APARTHEID SOCIETY
Helen Kruuse*
Rsumb
L'Afrique du Sud n'a pas vraiment de quoi etre fibre de son histoire. Englu6 dans
son approche fond6e sur la doctrine 's6par6s mais (in)6gaux', I'ancien systame
politique a eu des cons6quences d6vastatrices dans tous les secteurs, dont
6minemment celui de la famille. L'auteure avance que le r6gime g6ndral
d'apartheid en Afrique du Sud a t transpos6 dans le droit de la famille, marqu6
par la reconnaissance 6tatique du mariage blanc occidental monoganique et
laissant les autres formes de conjugalit6 (coutumidre, musulmane, homosexuelle,
hors mariage, etc) largement dans l'ombre. Le pr6sent chapitre fait 6tat de la
reconnaissance progressive des diff6rents modbles de mariage, fond6e sur le d6sir
de donner, dans l'Afrique du Sud de l'apr~s-apartheid, une protection 6gale a tous
les couples. Mais l'auteure se demande si cette prolif6ration n'a pas, en r6alit6,
occult6 la principale question, soit celle de la protection des personnes vuln6rables
au sein des couples (habituellement les femmes). Le texte s'int6resse d'abord aux
mariages coutumiers (avec une attention particulire au r6cent arret dans l'affaire
Ngwenyama v Mayelane), mais il traite 6galement des unions civiles et des
mariages musulmans.
I INTRODUCTION
South Africa does not have a particularly proud history. Marred by the politics
of separate but (un)equal treatment of its people, the country's past political
system has had a damaging effect in all spheres, but specifically on that of the
family. In the context of relationships, it is fair to say that the apartheid system
was replicated in family law, with the Western 'white' monogamous marriage
receiving the state's stamp of approval - leaving other relationships
(customary, Muslim, homosexual, cohabiting etc) largely out in the cold.
* Senior Lecturer, Law Faculty, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa.
The law of marriage in South Africa, as set out in the Marriage Act 25 of 1961, is a
combination of Roman-Dutch law and legislation. See B Clark 'History of the Roman-Dutch
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine recent legislative and judicial
interventions seeking to provide equal protection to these relationships in
post-apartheid South Africa, focusing on customary marriages. This
examination uses South Africa's Supreme Court of Appeal's decision of
Ngwenyama v Mayelane2 as a point of departure. The basic premise of the
chapter is that the way in which the state has sought to protect intimate
partnerships in South Africa continues to rest on the presumption of the
universality of marriage, and its form in the Judeo-Christian sense. As a result,
the interventions in South Africa have been piecemeal and inconsistent,
resulting in a proliferation of legislation which has created new forms of
discrimination between different relationships not foreseen by drafters and
decision-makers, and threatening the very people that they sought to protect:
vulnerable parties.
II OF SILOS AND FORM: NGWENYAMA V MAYELANE
(a) The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 -
the first silo
Before embarking on an account of the facts of the case, some consideration
needs to be given to the Act on which it is based, and the context in which it
was drafted and passed by the newly formed South African Parliament. With
the dawn of democracy in South Africa, negotiators disagreed on many things,
but the one issue agreed upon was the need for a decisive 'break from the past'.
This was epitomised in President Nelson Mandela's inaugural address 3 when he
stated: 'Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will
again experience the oppression of one by another ... '. The Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 was drafted with this express intention. The
Constitution has been described as a 'transformational' document, one which is
based on the values of dignity, freedom and equality. While there is no 'right to
family life' nor a 'right to marriage' per se, the constitutional drafters
recognised the importance of recognising diverse family forms in the text of
s 15(3). Up until this time, marriages could only be entered into in terms of the
common law as amended by the Marriage Act.4 The Act is generally only
available to majors (ie those over the age of 18 years old) who wish to enter
into a monogamous heterosexual marriage.5 Section 15(3) anticipated
recognition by the state of 'marriages concluded under any tradition, or a
system of religious, personal or family law; or systems of personal and family
law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a particular
law of marriage from a socioeconomic perspective' in DP Visser (ed) Essays on the History of
Law (Cape Town: Juta & Co, 1989) 152-212 for a detailed discussion on the history of
marriage in South Africa.
2 2012 (4) SA 527 (SCA).
Nelson Mandela, Inaugural Address, Pretoria 9 May 1994.
4 Act 25 of 1961.
See ss 24 26 of the Act which set out instances where those under the age of 18 years may get
consent to enter into a marriage.
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religion'. The section was however qualified by a requirement that such
recognition had to be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution,
including the rights of equality and dignity.6 While academics and
commentators began to discuss excluded forms of relationships as a general
and shared problem soon thereafter, the non-recognition of customary
marriages in particular was seen as a symbol of apartheid's racist policies. As a
result customary marriage was seen as the natural and logical priority for
reform, not only because it affected the most number of people, but also
because it was central in the bigger question on the status of customary law in
the post-apartheid order.7 Despite some opposition on the form that such
reform should take,8 a separate and exclusive Act was drafted for customary
marriages - co-existing alongside the Marriage Act.
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (RCMA), somewhat
controversially,9 allows polygany but - in keeping with attempts to equalise
spousal rights - requires that a husband obtain a court order before entering a
second marriage. The Act envisages that this court order will deal with the
marital property regime of the future marriage.10 In doing so, the court must
ensure that the spouses' property is equitably distributed, taking into account
all the relevant circumstances of the family groups affected. 1 Furthermore, it is
envisaged that the present and future wives must be joined in the process. 12
While the Act provides for registration of the marriage, 13 the Act expressly
states that registration is not a requirement of the marriage.14 This provision
was specifically aimed at the reality that many parties in customary marriages
6 Sections 9 and 10 respectively
Michael Yarbrough 'Toward a Political Sociology of Conjugal-Recognition Regimes:
Gendered Multiculturalism in South African Marriage Law' (2013) (forthcoming in Social
Politics, on file with author). Beth Goldblatt and Likhapha Mbatha 'Gender, culture and
equality: reforming customary law' in Engendering the Political Agenda: A South African Case
Study (Johannesburg: Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 1999) 83-110, Thandabantu Nhlapo
'Indigenous law and gender in South Africa: Taking human rights and cultural diversity
seriously' (1994-1995) Third World Legal Studies 49-71. See ss 30-31 of the Constitution
relating to the rights of persons to participate in the cultural life of their choice, subject to the
other rights in the Constitution.
For example, there were a number of organisations who made submissions to the South
African Law (Reform) Commission (which was commissioned to look into the issue) that
creating a separate law for customary marriage would suggest that South Africa was still at the
stage where it is unable to amalgamate under one unifying system - thus perpetuating racial
divisions (see note on the Law Commission Project 59, below n 63). It was also suggested at the
time that culturally specific laws would fossilise dynamic cultural practices into static rules,
much like the colonial and subsequent policies earlier attempts at codification (see Centre for
Applied Legal Studies, Gender Research Project 6, quoted in Yarbrough, above n 7, 36).
9 Felicity Kaganas and Christina Murray 'Law, Women and the Family: the Question of
Polygyny in a new South Africa' (1991) Acta Juridica 116 at 125.
1o Section 7(6).
Section 7(a)(ii) and (iii). Jacqueline Heaton 'Family Law' in Annual Survey of South African
Law (Cape Town: Juta & Co, 2010) 435 at 485.
12 Section 7(8).
" Section 4(1)ff.
14 Section 4(9).
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live in rural areas, are illiterate and most likely live in ignorance of the law.15 In
order to deal with the varied nature of customary law, the Act requires simply
that parties 'comply with the requirements of customary law', those
requirements being a matter to be determined by evidence. 16 As a result, courts
are left to decide what, in a given case, are the essential requirements of custom
and whether the parties have complied with them.
The problem with this provision is apparent from a number of conflicting court
decisions as to what these requirements are, and what 'fulfilment' of these
requirements requires.17 It is generally accepted that lobolos and a customary
ceremony have to be performed (formal integration of a woman into her
husband's family home)19 in order for a relationship to be formally recognised
as a marriage.20 However, courts have differed as to whether full payment of the
lobolo is necessary, and whether the formal integration of the bride has to take
place. As will be clear from the discussion below, the attempt to fit the
customary marriage into a civil marriage form with dichotomous terms such as
married and unmarried has had unfortunate consequences. Especially so when
a customary marriage in its true sense does not fit into one moment where the
parties say 'I do'. 2 1 These decisions have often resulted in a woman finding
" B Goldblatt 'Regulating domestic partnerships -A necessary step in the development of South
African family law' (2003) 120 SALJ 610 at 616.
16 Section 3(1)(b): 'the marriage must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance
with customary law'. Southon v Moropane (14295/10) [2012] ZAGPJHC 146 (18 July 2012)
para 86: 'To consider whether a valid customary marriage has come into being ..., requires a
fact-intensive enquiry'
1 For example, the cases of Motsoatsoa v Roro [2011] 2 All SA 324 (GSJ); Fanti v Boto 2008 (5)
SA 405 (C); Ndlovu v Mokoena 2009 (5) SA 400 (GNP) and Mthembu v Letsela 2000 (3) SA
867 (SCA).
'Property in cash or in kind ... which a prospective husband or the head of his family
undertakes to give to the head of the prospective wife's family in consideration of a customary
marriage' (s 1 of the RCMA). DG Koyana Customary Law in a Changing Society (Cape Town:
Juta & Co, 1980) at 5 observes that the lobolo custom is 'a thread through all Black nations of
Southern Africa'. See also JC Bekker Seymour's Customary Law in Southern Africa (Cape
Town: Juta & Co, 1989) 151 who has described lobolo as 'a rock on which the Africans'
marriage is founded'. After the Act, Dlamini (cited by LL Mofokeng 'The lobola agreement as
the silent prerequisite for the validity of a customary marriage in terms of the Recognition of
Customary Marriage Act' (2005) 68 THRHR 277 at 279) observed: 'Blacks in general: are
unable to regard a relationship as a marriage even if there can be compliance with all legal
requirements if lobolo has not been delivered or an agreement for its delivery [has not been]
concluded.'
19 The South African Law (Reform) Commission set out in para 4.4.8 of its report that:
'customary law always tends to be flexible and pragmatic. Ceremonies may be abbreviated as
circumstances dictate, and especially in urban areas, they may be ignored altogether. Even
within a close-knit community, opinions may vary on how essential a ritual is and how it
should be performed.' See South African Law Commission Report on Customary Marriages
(1998) Project 90.
20 TW Bennett 'Legal Pluralism and the family in South Africa: Lessons from Customary Law
Reform' (2011) 25 Emory International Law Review 1029 at 1046.
21 IP Maithufi and JC Bekker 'The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 1998 and its
Impact on Family Law in South Africa' 35 (2002) CILSA 182 who set out clearly that a
customary marriage in true African tradition should be seen as not an event but a process that
comprises a chain of events.
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herself outside of the definition of 'marriage' due to a lack of compliance with
form, despite many years within a so-called 'marriage'. 22
(b) Ngwenyama v Mayelane
It is with this background that we turn back to the case of Mayelane.
Ms Modjadji Mayelane alleged that she married Mr Mphephu Ngwenyama
under Tsonga customary law in 1984, but the marriage was never registered.
Three children were born of the marriage. After Mr Ngwenyama's death in
2009 Ms Mayelane tried to register her customary law marriage. While at the
Department of Home Affairs, she was informed that Mr Ngwenyama had
married another woman in 2008, also under customary law, and that such
marriage was registered in terms of the Act's provisions. The primary issue
before the court a quo was the interpretation of s 7(6) of the Act. 2 3
Ms Mayelane applied for the second marriage - which she did not know about
- to be declared void as a result of a lack of compliance with the provision. As
set out above, s 7(6) requires the man to apply to court to finalise a contract
that will regulate the future matrimonial property system of the marriages
before he enters into a subsequent marriage. The problem with the provision is
that it does not set out the consequences of a failure to obtain a court-approved
contract.24 Mr Ngwenyama did not make such an application in respect of his
2008 marriage, and the question that the court had to address was whether the
failure to do so rendered the second marriage void. In finding for the first wife,
Bertelsmann J emphasised the prejudice likely to be suffered by her where the
second marriage has not been disclosed, holding that:
'The failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of this subsection cannot
but lead to the invalidity of a subsequent customary marriage, even though the
Act does not contain an express provision to that effect. Cronje and Heaton argue
in South African Family Law 2ed at 204, that the court's intervention would be
rendered superfluous - which the legislature could not have intended - if invalidity
did not result from a failure to observe ss (6).'
The learned judge continued at para 25:
'A further argument, that failure to comply with the subsection leads to invalidity
of the subsequent further customary marriage, arises from the peremptory
language of the provision: the word "must", read with the provisions of
subsection (7)(b)(iii), empowering the court to refuse to register a proposed
contract, indicates that the legislature intended non-compliance to lead to
voidness of a marriage in conflict with the provision.' 25
22 Motsoatsoa, above n 17.
23 The judgment in the court a quo is reported as MM v MN & another 2010 (4) SA 286 (GNP).
24 Section 7(6): 'A husband in a customary marriage who wishes to enter into a further customary
marriage with another woman after the commencement of this Act must make application to
the court to approve a written contract which will regulate the future matrimonial property
system of his marriages.' Emphasis added.
25 In this regard, Bertelsmann J cited Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Pepper Bay
Fishing (Pty) Ltd; Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Smith 2004 (1) SA 308
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On appealing the decision to void the second marriage to the Supreme Court of
Appeal, the court came to a different conclusion. It found that s 7(6) was not
peremptory and that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to
effect so fundamental a change to the customary law of polygamy by subjecting
the validity of a second marriage to prior consent by a court, which could
withhold it. The court also highlighted the discrimination visited upon the
second wife who would not have her marriage recognised but for the husband's
conduct.
Notwithstanding the fact that the requirements of a customary marriage (as
contemplated in s 3(1)(b)) was not the locus of debate in both the High Court
and Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), the Constitutional Court (CC) - on an
appeal against the SCA decision - gave practice directions to the parties to deal
with the issue: whether under Tsonga customary law the first wife's consent was
required before the husband could enter a second marriage. If the appellant
could establish that Tsonga law required the women's consent and as
Ms Mayelane did not give her consent, it would follow that this would render
the 2008 marriage void regardless of compliance with s 7(6).
In addition to issuing these practice directions, the Constitutional Court also
admitted three amici curiae to assist it. In heads of argument filed with the
court, the Women's Legal Centre Trust supported the findings of the SCA, and
argued that the High Court's approach is 'unduly and unnecessarily harsh' on
subsequent wives who do not have the consent of the first wife (this deprives
the subsequent wives of important 'legal and constitutional protections'). The
Rural Women's Movement and the Commission for Gender Equality submitted
that insufficient evidence was presented at the High Court to entertain the
question whether it was part of the customs of the Tsonga people to require the
consent of the first wife. Accordingly, they argued the matter should be
remitted back to the High Court for reconsideration.
While the matter was heard on 20 November 2012, the Constitutional Court
has yet to deliver judgment on the issue.
(c) Of form and silos
The Mayelane case and the way in which various other courts have dealt with
the issues of registration and requirements arguably demonstrate the
shortcomings of the current approach to intimate partnerships in South Africa.
The fall-back position has been to hide behind form without enquiring into the
role played by the partnership and whether that valuable role should be
protected. It shows how its marriage-centric approach has resulted in relegating
the more important issues of vulnerability and dependency to the footnotes
and obiter dicta of the courts, not just in respect of customary marriage, but in
(SCA) para 32 where it was held that 'language of a predominantly imperative nature such as
"must" is to be construed as peremptory unless there are other circumstances which negate this
construction'.
348
Regulating Marriages & Partnerships in a Diverse, Post-Apartheid Society 349
respect of all forms of intimate relationships. 26 While the state and courts
continue to espouse the importance of 'family' in all shapes and forms -
especially in the context of welfare policy - they continue to require intimate
relationships to resemble a particular form of a marriage before recognition
and protection will be meted out. In the Mayelane case, remittal on form
appears to be the easy route, since the remittal court can work on a technical
evidential point about the formal requirements of customary law without
contemplating the effect of such a test for the women in question who bona fide
believed that they were married. While the courts can be faulted for obsessing
with form, effectively they have been set up by the legislation they have to
enforce. As explained below, an elaborate structure of marriage-form 'silos' has
left them with little choice. This formalist way of organising intimate
relationships undermines the very purpose for which the structure was set up.
What are these marriage-form silos? The sociologist, Yarbrough, aptly
describes the 'silo technique' as a 'less-noticed' feature in South African law
which allows for the recognition of newly incorporated conjugal forms but
within their own statutory and administrative structures. 27 These silos set up
similar-type form requirements to that of marriage, leaving out the more
important issues of dependency and function. The result of such
non-compliance with form has led to hardships for women - whether a first or
second wife or only one wife - since the failure to comply with a form that is
constantly evolving means that many women are left uncertain as to their
status, especially as it appears as if the lack of protection of a first or second
'spouse' is directly dependent on the (in)action of the 'husband'. There is also
the reality of differing consequences for differing types of marriages - when the
woman may or may not know the legal consequences or differences between the
two. It seems appropriate at this point to give a simple example of this
consequence. One should keep this example in mind in the light of the
widespread ignorance of the RCMA and marriage law generally.28
In the light of the Supreme Court of Appeal's relatively recent case in
Netshituka v Netshituka,29 I can make the broad statement: If a man has a
customary marriage with A and, without or with As knowledge, enters into
subsequent civil marriage with B, the latter marriage is void. This much is set
out in terms of s 3(2) of the RCMA which prohibits a spouse, who is a party to
26 Denise Meyerson 'Who's in and who's out? Inclusion and exclusion in the family law
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa' (2010) 3 Constitutional Court
Review 295.
27 Yarbrough, above n 7, 5.
28 In recent focus group interviews with women in a four rural villages in the Eastern Cape, South
Africa in 2012 only one of 71 women in a customary marriage knew of the existence of the
Recognition of Customary Marriage Act (transcripts on file with author, these focus group
interviews are part of a bigger project on customary marriages conducted with Lea
Mwambene, at the University of the Western Cape). This was foreseen by the authors,
Maithufi and Bekker, above n 21, who suggested that the RCMA would be simply a 'paper law'
(196-197).
29 426/10 [2011] ZACSA 120. See also Thembisile v Thembisile 2002 (2) SA 209 (T) para 32 which
comes to the same conclusion.
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a valid customary marriage, from entering into a civil marriage in terms of the
Marriage Act. This also follows from the requirement that a 'civil' marriage is
monogamous. However, one could compare the women in Netshituka with the
women in the Mayelane case discussed above. Following the Mayelane case, I
can make the following set of statements: Man has a customary marriage with
A. With or without Xs consent, man has a subsequent customary marriage
with B. The latter marriage is valid - again according to the SCA. The
comparison begs the question: what really is the distinction between the second
spouses in each scenario? In fact, one could argue that the second 'wife' in
Netshituka had more reason to believe that her marriage was 'valid' given the
belief that conventional marriage or the 'white wedding' is 'official' or
recognised. So it appears that it is inevitable that one of the 'wives' will be
discarded in some way and that their status rests on the action or inaction of
the husband. Part of the problem is tied to the attempt to situate customary
marriages in a formal system with 'simple dichotomous terms such as married
and unmarried'. Such attempts have been made without regard to the nature of
customary law which is identified by so-called 'cultural elites' 30 and which is
constantly in flux - even to the point that polygamy has become less of a key
signifier of the customary law culture. 31
III SILOED STATUTORY ARCHITECTURE
While South Africa has been hailed as having the world's most expansive
marriage laws, 32 the way in which family forms have been recognised
post-apartheid has - paradoxically - led to new, more nuanced forms of
discrimination. While the South African Law Commission at the early stages
suggested a default marriage mode for all types of intimate relationships, the
politically important and urgent choice of producing a separate Act for
customary marriages has directed future intervention. The result is piecemeal
legislation and proposed legislation producing separate statutory and
administrative structures for each previously unrecognised intimate
partnership. Indeed this siloing technique is evident in the subsequent
legislation which followed on from the RCMA, becoming the default approach.
This is evident in two subsequent 'silos' and proposed legislation, as set out
below.
30 Yarbrough, above n 7, 41.
31 In a 2013 interview with the Chief and his elders in three of the four villages in the Eastern
Cape, no elder could remember a polygamous marriage in the area - a time spanning almost
60-70 years given the estimated age of some elders as 80 years old (transcript on file with
author). Interestingly, Stacey and Meadow document that historically, polygynous marriages
were relatively rare in South Africa, but that colonial authorities and African male elders
colluded in codifying a rigid form of customary law out of gender and family practices that
had been fluid and less detrimental to women. See Judith Stacey and Tey Meadow 'New Slants
on the Slippery Slope: The Politics of Polygamy and Gay Family Rights in South Africa and
the United States' (2009) 37 Politics & Society 167 at 176.
32 Ibid at 175.
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(a) Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 - the second silo?
In the last few years, debate about the recognition of the right of persons of the
same sex to marry each other has dominated the family law sphere across
jurisdictions. 33 Importantly, Stacey and Meadow have noted that South Africa
is the world's only jurisdiction thus far to recognise customary (that is,
potentially polygamous) marriages as well as same-sex marriages. 34 While
customary marriages were recognised by legislative fiat, the right of persons of
the same sex to marry was a product of the Constitutional Court's direction in
Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Others; Lesbian and Gay
Equality Project and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others.3 5 In this
judgment, the Constitutional Court declared the common law definition of
marriage invalid insofar as it did not permit same-sex couples to enjoy the
status, benefits and responsibilities accorded to heterosexual couples. To
remedy this invalidity, the court directed the legislature to provide for
recognition of same-sex unions. If it failed to do so within a year, the court held
that same-sex couples could automatically marry in terms of the statute
governing marriage in South Africa, namely, the Marriage Act. The adoption
of the Civil Union Act 36 followed, literally a year later, again in an urgent
manner but this time due to the time constraints imposed by the court.37 The
court gave the South African Parliament various options, one of them being to
provide for one marriage Act to cover various different conjugal regimes.
Notwithstanding, the legislature took its cue from the RCMA and passed a
separate Act for same-sex partners. To remedy a possible constitutional
challenge to this 'separate but equal' treatment, at the last minute Parliament
amended the Act to give couples forming a civil partnership in terms of its
provisions, the right to call their civil partnerships a 'marriage'. 38
While the Act has been hailed as progressive - especially in the light of
continuing debates in the United States about same-sex marriage recognition -
" See Jamie Gardiner 'Same-sex marriage: A worldwide trend?' in Paula Gerber and Adiva Sifris
(eds) Current Trends in the Regulation of Same-Sex Relationships (2011) 28 Law in Context
Special Issue 92.
34 Stacey and Meadow, above n 31, at 171.
3 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC).
36 Act 17 of 2006.
3 One year from date of judgment.
3 Section 11(1) of the Act states that '[a] marriage officer must inquire from the parties
appearing before him or her whether their civil union should be known as a marriage or a civil
partnership ... '. The ability to call a civil partnership a 'marriage' was a late amendment to the
Bill. It was strongly argued in Parliamentary debate that, without this ability, the Bill would be
glaringly unconstitutional since it would create a separate and unequal regime - resonant with
apartheid laws. It is interesting to note that the United Kingdom's Civil Partnership Act 2004
does exactly this: creates a regime for same-sex couples which is separate to marriage (and
cannot be called same). See Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam), where the Court
noted at para 121 that the Act bestows upon civil partners 'effectively all the rights,
responsibilities, benefits and advantages of civil marriage save the name'. This view has also
been propounded in a South African case, AS v CS 2011 (2) SA 360 (WCC) para 37: 'a civil
partnership concluded under the English Act has all the hallmarks of a marriage, save that it
may not be termed so under that act'.
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the 'silo' it creates has resulted in some strange consequences. In the first place,
the Act contains no transitional arrangements, with the result that same-sex
partners who do not enter a civil partnership in terms of the Act continue to
this day to benefit from 'interim' protections made by the court before the Act
came into operation. The rationale for these protections at the time was that
same-sex partners were unable to get married, and so these court-ordered
interventions were deemed to be necessary. It is worth mentioning that the
court on a previous occasion found that it would not recognise or protect
opposite-sex life partnerships (ie heterosexual life partnerships or cohabitees)
since the parties, despite being legally permitted to marry, chose not to do so.39
The result was foreseen in Gory v Kolver 40 a case involving the right to inherit
intestate from a same-sex life partner. Decided 6 days before the Civil Union
Act came into force (29 November 2006), the court found that a same-sex
partner would be treated as the intestate heir where a life partnership existed
and one of the partners passed away. Part of the rationale of the court was that
since same-sex partners could not get married, they needed greater protection.
However, the court continued to state (at para 29):
'Unless specifically amended, section 1(1) [of South Africa's Intestate Succession
Act] will ... also apply to permanent same-sex life partners who have undertaken
reciprocal duties of support but who do not "marry" under any new dispensation.'
It followed this comment by stating that it saw 'no good reason for
distinguishing between unmarried heterosexual couples and unmarried
same-sex couples in respect of intestate succession' once the impediment to
marry was removed (as was the case 6 days later by the passing of the Civil
Union Act). The court, no doubt, thought that Parliament would deal with this
issue, something which it failed to do in its haste to create yet another silo.
Seven years later, the position remains: while both same-sex and opposite-sex
life partners have the opportunity to marry, partners who die in an opposite-sex
non-marriage relationship will not be able to inherit intestate from each other,
while a same-sex partner will be able to do so. This situation has been described
as peculiar,41 ironic, 42 paradoxical43 and anomalous.44 This is even more so the
case, given other amendments post-Civil Union Act. One such law relates to the
ability of a partner to be recognised as the parent of a child conceived of
artificial insemination. Due to the introduction of new legislation, only a
'spouse' of a 'married couple' may register as parent where she (or he) is not the
39 Volks v Robinson 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) paras 55-60.
40 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC).
41 H Kruuse 'Here's to you, Mrs Robinson": peculiarities and paragraph 29 in determining the
treatment of domestic partnerships' (2009) 25 SAJHR 380-391.
42 P De Vos 'Still out in the cold? The Domestic Partnerships Bill and the non-protection of
marginalised woman' [sic] in J Sloth-Nielsen and Z du Toit (eds) Trials & Tribulations, Trends
& Triumphs (Cape Town: Juta & Co, 2008) 129 at 129.
43 P De Vos and J Barnard 'Same-sex marriage, civil unions and domestic partnerships in South
Africa: critical reflections on an ongoing saga' (2007) 124 SALJ 795 at 823.
44 F Du Bois and C Himonga 'Life Partnerships' in F du Bois (ed) Wille's Principles of South
African Law (9ed, Juta & Co, 2007) 363 at 369. See also L Picarra 'Gory v Kolver NO 2007 (4)
SA 97 (CC)' (2007) 23 SAJHR 563 at 565.
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birth mother.45 Thus, those who have not formalised their relationship in terms
of the Civil Union Act may inherit intestate from one another, but may not
both be recognised as parents to a child which is artificially conceived. This is
an inconsistency which simply cannot be explained.
The 'separate' nature of the Act then has resulted in the inconsistent and
unequal treatment of partners in a variety of arrangements from the serious
implications in one's ability to inherit intestate from one another; as evidenced
in Gory v Kolver recognition as a parent; as evidenced in s 40 of the Children's
Act, uncertainty as to marriage regimes applicable, 46 to the more mundane
surname choices available to partners. 47 The latter two issues have arisen due to
the drafters' hasty efforts to mimic marriage in a separate 'silo' for same-sex
partners - especially evident in s 13 of the Act which attempts to create a
'catch-all' for civil partnerships by setting out that:
'(1) The legal consequences of a marriage contemplated in the Marriage Act
apply, with such changes as may be required by the context, to a civil union.
(2) With the exception of the Marriage Act and the Customary Marriages Act,
any references to-
a. Marriage in any other law, including the common law, includes, with such
changes as may be required by the context, a civil union; and
b. Husband, wife or spouse in any other law, including the common law,
includes a civil union partner.'48
The idea that one can simply read in gender-neutral terms where necessary
reveals a major concern. It obfuscates the reality that our marriage law assigns
duties and responsibilities 'specifically and exclusively' to husbands and wives -
unwittingly revealing the gender-discrimination inherent in the institution of
marriage protected by the Marriage Act. 4 9 It is inevitable that absurdities will
45 Section 40 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (which came into force on 1 July 2007). The
situation was previously governed by s 5 of the Children's Status Act 82 of 1987. The section,
which reads much the same as s 40 does now, was declared unconstitutional in J v
Director-General, Department of Home Affairs 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) since it did not permit a
same-sex life partner to be regarded as the parent of a child born of artificial fertilisation
where that partner was not the birth mother. While the return to the original position by
Parliament has been called 'prima facie unconstitutional' by some, it has been justified on the
basis of the coming into force of the Civil Union Act. See J Heaton Family Law (Durban:
LexisNexis, 3rd edn, 2010) 251 252.
46 See example below.
47 Section 26(1) of the Births and Registration Act 51 of 1992 sets out that a woman may assume
the surname of her husband or take on a double-barrel surname without official permission,
but a man must obtain the consent of the Director-General to assume the name of his wife.
This section would of course be applicable to those in a civil union by virtue of s 13.
Notwithstanding the subordinate nature of regulations, the Minister of Home Affairs has
purportedly created an entirely separate regime for the adoption of surnames of civil partners
in regulations to the Civil Union Act, which supposedly place civil union partners in better
position than men in civil marriages simpliciter.
48 Emphasis added.
49 E le Roux 'What a farrago' (2007) April Without Prejudice 71. See also Chris McConnachie
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result. One such absurdity is the previously mentioned example of uncertainty
regarding the application of a default marriage property regime. It is settled in
South African private international law that, in the absence of an antenuptial
agreement, the proprietary consequences of a marriage are determined by the
legal system of the country where the husband was domiciled at the time of
marriage (the lex domicilii matrimonii).50 Applying s 13 to a scenario where
same-sex partners are domiciled in different countries at the time of the
marriage leaves same-sex partners with a conundrum: what matrimonial
domicile applies when neither or both are 'husbands'? The only way to remedy
this uncertainty is for partners to adopt and imitate heterosexual marriage
roles, choosing whether they are a 'husband' or a 'wife'. The danger of this
approach is plain: the need to simulate a heterosexual marriage to achieve
certainty in a civil partnership implies that that civil partnership is not quite
equal in worth and significance51 to the 'original' Marriage Act-marriage.
It is perhaps in the sensitive area of religion that the state has implicitly
declared its allegiance to heterosexual monogamous marriage as the norm and
'approved' structure of intimate partnership. Section 15 of the South African
Constitution provides for freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and
opinion. Given South Africa's 'suppressive' history, toleration of diversity and
religion has been seen as an important positive social goal. 5 2 In the context
then of same-sex marriages, it is arguably fair that marriage officers who are
employed by religious associations instead of the state (ministers, rabbis and
priests of the diverse religions who opt to become marriage officers) should not
be forced to solemnise a same-sex union. 53 However, what about state
employees who are de facto marriage officers by virtue of their position within
state structures? Section 6 of the Civil Union Act is a type of 'conscientious
objection clause' which exempts a state marriage officer by setting out that he
or she:
'may in writing inform the Minister [of Home Affairs] that he or she objects on the
ground [sic] of conscience, religion and belief to solemnising a civil union
between persons of the same sex, whereupon that marriage officer shall not be
compelled to solemnise such civil union.'
The clause is not in the form of a request, nor does the clause require the state
official to substantiate the grounds for the objection or the reasons therefor. So
'With such changes as may be required by the context": the legal consequences of marriage
through the lens of section 13 of the Civil Union Act' (2010) 127 South African Law Journal
424, 425 and 442.
'0 Frankel's Estate v The Master 1950 (1) SA 220 (A).
5 P de Vos 'Same-sex sexual desire and the re-imagining of the South African family' (2004)
SAJHR 179 at 198. See also E Bonthuys 'Race and gender in the Civil Union Act' (2007) 23
SAJHR 526 at 538.
52 Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC)
para 170.
5 South Africa's Marriage Act provides for both civil and religious marriage officers to preside
over marriages which have both religious and civil significance. Section 3(1) of the Act then
provides for the appointments of officials of religious groups who conduct marriages
according to 'Christian, Jewish or Mohammedan rites or the rites of any Indian religion'.
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for example, where a state official is simply homophobic, detached from any
religious belief, that official can refuse to marry a couple. This then is the 'face'
of the state - the same-sex couple who are brave enough to publicly declare
their commitment to each other54 may still be denied by the state literally 'at the
door', in the form of its objecting official. It is perhaps the comparison with the
lack of a conscientious objection clause in the civil Marriage Act that is most
troubling. In terms of the Marriage Act, a civil marriage officer may not object
to marrying couples in terms of the Marriage Act on the basis of their
conscience, belief and opinion - this is the case even if civil marriage officers
have religious or other beliefs against inter-racial or inter-faith marriages; they
must solemnise the union. The common example is that a devout and
conservative Roman Catholic state official must solemnise a marriage between
previously divorced partners even though it is clearly against his or her religious
beliefs. The net result of s 6 is that the only ground upon which a state official
can object to solemnising any marriage - be it a 'marriage' in terms of the
Marriage Act or a 'marriage' in terms of the Civil Union Act - is the sexual
orientation of the couple. Sexual orientation is thus singled out for particular
(exclusionary) treatment. This is despite the fact that discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation is a listed ground in the constitution's equality
clause.55 The exemption clause then suggests that sexual orientation is in some
way different to other equality categories (such as race and faith). It also
suggests that the state endorses the view that same-sex relationships merit
different treatment as compared with heterosexual relationships.56
(b) Proposed legislation: the Muslim Marriage Bill 2003, 2010
and the Domestic Partnerships Bill57
And so it goes. The siloed statutory architecture, commencing with the RCMA
and then the Civil Union Act, has set the scene for proposed legislation in the
form of the Muslim Marriage Bill drafted initially in 2003, with a new draft
circulated in 2010. And so too the Domestic Partnerships Bill, circulated in
54 'Brave' in the sense that, despite South Africa's unambiguous and wide-ranging protections
and rights, patriarchy and homophobia are intense and widespread. 'Coming out' in South
Africa, especially in contemporary black culture, has had dire results in 'gay bashing' including
the phenomenon of 'curative rape' of lesbians and occasional homicides. See Jacklyn Cock
'Engendering Gay and Lesbian Rights: The equality clause in the South African Constitution'
26 (2003) Women Studies International Forum 35 at 40-44, and Stacey and Meadow, above n
31, at 178. See also Michael Cameron Wood-Bodley 'Intestate succession and gay and lesbian
couples' (2008) 125 SALJ 46.
5 Section 9. South Africa was the first country in the world to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in its Constitution. See M Gevisser 'A Different Fight for Freedom:
A History of South African Lesbian and Gay Organisation from the 1950s to the 1990s' in M
Gevisser and E Cameron (eds) Defiant Desire: Gay and Lesbian Lives in South Africa (New
York: Routledge, 1995) 14-86.
56 David Bilchitz and Melanie Judge 'For Whom Does the Bell Toll? The Challenges and
Possibilities the Civil Union Act Creates for Family Law in South Africa' (2007) 23 South
African Journal of Human Rights 491.
Government Gazette No 30633 of 14 January 2008.
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2008, and still awaiting its first reading. While space does not allow for a full
analysis of these Bills, a few comments are apposite.58
(i) The Domestic Partnerships Bill - a third silo?
First, and as way of background and as alluded to above, South Africa does
not provide protection to heterosexual life partners since they have an election
to marry, but choose not to do so. This much is clear from the highly criticised
decision of the Constitutional Court in Volks NO v Robinson and others.59
Despite the recognition of the Volks court that there was a need to protect these
types of intimate partnerships, 60 the court commented that it was 'up to the
legislature to make provision for this'. 61
Even before this Bill, the protection of opposite-sex life partnerships was
contemplated in the Civil Union Bill 26 of 2006 published on 31 August 2006.
However, any reference to domestic partnerships was deleted in the final
version of the Bill 6 2 and the subsequent Act. This is presumably because the
legislature ran out of time due to the Fourie-deadline which required it to adopt
measures to protect same-sex couples by the end of November 2006. So while
the state has shown a willingness in draft legislation to do so, it has failed to
provide effective protection of opposite-sex couples.
(ii) The Muslim Marriage Bill 2010 - a fourth silo?
The Muslim Marriage Bill that is currently being debated has a long history -
with an initial Bill being drafted as far back as 2001, just one year after the
RCMA.63 The Bill is similar in structure to the RCMA in that it purports to
58 See Bradley Smith's chapter on South Africa's Domestic Partnerships Bill: 'The Statutory
Domestic Partnership Cometh' in B Atkin (ed) International Survey of Family Law 2010
Edition (Jordan Publishing, 2010) 297.
59 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). See in particular, para 92 of the judgment. The issue of choice is
critiqued in the minority judgment of Sachs J who reflects at para 225: 'While it is necessary to
emphasise the importance of people taking responsibility for their lives, and to acknowledge
the extraordinary self-reliance shown by many women in the face of extreme hardship, the law
cannot ignore the fact that lack of resources has left many women with harsh options only
Their choice has been between destitution, prostitution and loneliness, on the one hand, and
continuing cohabitation with a person who was unwilling or unable to marry them on the
other.'
6o Skweyiya J (writing for the majority) at para 65 stated: 'I accept that laws aimed at regulating
these relationships in order to ensure that a vulnerable partner within the relationship is not
unfairly taken advantage of are appropriate.'
61 Para 67. See further para 68: 'The answer [to addressing the concerns of vulnerable women in
cohabiting relationships] lies in legal provisions that will make a real difference to vulnerable
women at a time when both partners to the relationship are still alive.'
62 Bill 26B of 2006.
63 See South African Law Commission Issue Paper 15 Project 59 Islamic Marriages and Related
Matters (May 2000), SALRC Project 59 Discussion Paper 101 on Islamic marriages and related
matters (2001) and SALRC Project 59 Islamic Marriages and Related Matters Report (2003).
The reports contained both the 2001 and 2003 Bills (134 and 110 respectively). For a summary
of how the investigations fared in the early 1990s, see Rautenbach et al 'Constitutional
Analysis' in Bekker et al Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa (South Africa:
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deal with the requirements of a marriage, the matrimonial regime applicable
and dissolution of the same. No doubt the drafters thought the RCMA
example could be followed 'with such changes as are required by the context'. It
is clear from the recent experiences with the Civil Union Act that this approach
inevitably produces practical challenges, if not reproducing even more serious
equality concerns not only between the parties within the marriage, but as
compared to parties in similar intimate partnerships (viz marriage, civil
partnerships etc).64 Over 10 years later, and a failed court-intervention in
2009,65 a new Bill is currently being discussed but is far from being finalised,
given the lack of consensus about its content. This is simply because the Bill
has attempted to reconcile the rules and principles of classical or traditional
Islamic family law with South African constitutional values, no doubt because
it will have to operate in that environment. 66 The result is a religion versus law
debate, with Muslim clerics objecting inter alia that the Bill subordinates
Islamic law to the state. This is evident in its requirements that secular courts
(and not religious authorities) handle disputes and divorces. This has been
commonly referred to as 'secular interference in matters religious'. 67
The issues of equality across each type of intimate partnership results in
anomalies, similar to those found in the comparison between same-sex and
opposite-sex life partnerships, between rights of married couples and those
married in terms of a civil partnership, and as between those married in terms
of customary law and those married in terms of the Marriage Act. These
LexisNexis, 2nd edn, 2006) 162ff. See also Rautenbach 'Some comments on the current (and
future) status of Muslim Personal Law in South Africa' 2004 PER 1 and N Moosa Unveiling
the Mind. The Legal Position of Women in Islam - A South African Context (Cape Town: Juta
& Co, 2nd edn, 2011) 143-162 discussing the South African Law (Reform) Commission's work
with Islamic law.
64 Shachar 'The puzzle of interlocking power hierarchies: sharing the pieces of jurisdictional
authority' (2000) Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review 385, 406-426 poignantly
argues that '[w]ell-meaning accommodation policies by the state, aimed at leveling the playing
field between minority communities and the wider society, may unwittingly allow systematic
maltreatment of individuals within the accommodated minority group - an impact, in certain
cases, so severe that it nullifies these individuals' rights as citizens' (386). Shachar suggests that
'[a] truly comprehensive multicultural citizenship model must identify and defend only those
group based accommodations that coherently coalesce with the improvement of the status of
traditionally subordinated classes of individuals within minority group cultures' (389).
61 In Women's Centre Legal Trust v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 (6) SA 94 (CC),
the Trust sought to force the President and Parliament, through the Constitutional Court, to
prepare, initiate, enact and implement 'an Act of Parliament providing for the recognition of
all Muslim marriages as valid marriages for all purposes in South Africa and regulating the
consequences of such recognition' within 18 months (para 1). The application failed on the
issue of direct access (see s 167(4)(e) of the Constitution).
66 Jan L Neels 'Constitutional Aspects of the Muslim Marriages Bill' (2012) TSAR 486-506 at
486.
67 Navsa (SCA judge and Committee Leader for the SALRC Project Committee on Muslim
Marriages) commented in 2004 that '[w]hilst there are parties ... who do not see any value in
secular interference in matters religious, the majority of the participants in the process ... are
intent on engaging with others to achieve a workable and generally acceptable statutory system
of regulation of Muslim marriages' (Navsa 'Muslim personal law - an update' in Sloth-Nielsen
and Du Toit (eds) Trials and Tribulations: Trends and Triumphs (Cape Town: Juta & Co, 2008)
113 at 115).
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anomalies will multiply if the Muslim Marriage Bill is passed. There is a certain
irony that the Bill may grant more protection and relief to Muslim women in
certain contexts (for example, maintenance post-divorce) than women married
in terms of the Marriage Act,68 while granting them fewer rights in other
contexts (for example, freedom to marry!). 69
Perhaps the most puzzling of all the examples of differential treatment that will
come about if the Muslim Marriage Bill is passed is on the issue of the default
matrimonial property regime that will be applicable to the marriage. In South
Africa, the primary matrimonial property system is universal community of
property.70 This means that when a couple enters into a civil marriage, a
rebuttable presumption arises that the parties are marrying in community of
property.7 1 When the RCMA came into force, it provided that monogamous
marriages concluded after the Act were deemed to be concluded in community
of property, unless the parties concluded an antenuptial contract specifically
choosing another matrimonial property regime.72 However, proprietary
consequences of customary marriages concluded before commencement of the
Act would still be governed by traditional customary law.73 In Gumede v
President of the Republic of South Africa,74 the Constitutional Court found that
the application of different matrimonial property regimes based on the timing
of the Act was unconstitutional and accordingly ordered that all monogamous
marriages before the commencement of the Act must also be regarded as
concluded ex lege in community of property, unless the parties indicated
otherwise.
Why is this relevant to the Muslim Marriage debate? Clause 8(1) of the Bill sets
out that all marriages concluded in terms of the Bill will be deemed to be out of
community of property, unless the parties chose another matrimonial property
61 See, for example, clause 11(2)(c) of the Muslim Marriage Bill which provides for the payment
of iddah (that is, compulsory maintenance for 3 months after the divorce) and remuneration
ujrah al-hadanah (during the breastfeeding period, not exceeding 2 years). These payments may
well be more than what a Muslim woman would be granted in terms of secular law, where,
strictly speaking, the duty of support terminates on the date of the court order for divorce
unless s 7 of the Divorce Act is invoked. See Strauss v Strauss 1974 3 SA 79 (A) and Botha v
Botha 2009 3 SA 89 (W) at para 30. Even if s 7 is invoked, the courts have been reluctant to
grant long-term maintenance, preferring no, rehabilitative, or token maintenance - depending
on the spouses' circumstances.
69 Clause 5(8) of the Bill states that '[t]he prohibition of a Muslim marriage between persons on
account of their relationship by blood or affinity or fosterage, or any other reason, is
determined by Islamic law'. Neels, above n 66, at 493-494, points out that the clause fails to
expressly refer to the prohibition of marriages on religious and gender bases. According to
Islamic law, Muslim men may marry Muslim, Jewish or Christian women, but Muslim women
are only allowed to marry Muslim men; non-Muslim men are therefore not allowed to marry
Muslim women. The prohibition - although concealed under the broad reference to 'other
reasons' - treats married women in different contexts differently as well as treating parties
within a marriage differently See Moosa, above n 63, at 33-37.
7o Heaton, above n 45, at 65.
7 Edelstein v Edelstein 1952 (3) SA 1 (A).
72 Section 7(2).
7 Section 7(1).
74 2009 (3) SA 152 (CC).
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regime in an antenuptial contract. Thus marriages under this new Bill will not
lead to the community of property regime. Why commit the same error? Did
the drafters learn nothing from the Gumede case? It is highly likely that the
provision will be dealt with in a similar fashion to that in the Gumede case:
indeed, the unfair discrimination in Gumede was based on a direct comparison
between the legal position of women married under customary law and women
married in terms of the Marriage Act. If the clause remains, it will mean that
the socio-economically weaker party (usually the woman) in a Muslim
marriage is worse off than the socio-economically weaker party in both
customary and 'civil' marriages.75 This example brings to mind a saying
commonly ascribed to Albert Einstein: 'Insanity: doing the same thing over
and over again and expecting different results.' Yet another silo brings yet
another differentiation issue.
IV CONCLUSION: THE MONOLITH OF MARRIAGE
In a seminal article,76 Justice Froneman reflected on the South African legal
culture and legal reasoning in general by noting that:
'We [South African lawyers] analyse the body of law into compartments and
concepts in order to make sense of the whole. As reasoning humans we can hardly
do otherwise. So we divide the law into public and private law, into contract,
delict, family law, succession and the like; and then we create concepts in each
category to explain the workings of the categories ... All this is necessary but there
is a danger too, namely that we forget that our compartmentalisation and
conceptualisation are in the end merely constructs of our own reason. We begin to
think that the compartments and concepts actually have lives of their own, that
somehow they exist outside our construction of them. They, the systems and
concepts, then start to rule us and we absolve ourselves from the responsibility of
making the actual legal decisions. When that happens, the reality of actual social
and judicial choices on contested issues becomes hidden from scrutiny.'77
While Froneman was certainly not considering the regulation of intimate
partnerships in this article, his sentiments certainly resound in the family law
context, especially as he goes on to state:
'[South Africa's] past legal tradition and culture is strong on the analytical part;
weak on the critical part flowing from a realistic look at how the practice of law
worked on the ground; and forgetful of its own heritage on the substantive,
normative part.'78
It has been argued that the possibility of a court order for the redistribution of assets upon
divorce ameliorates the position of the weaker party. This is not a convincing solution given
that the possibility of redistribution does not feature during the marriage or at death, and
relies on the discretion of the court.
6 JC Froneman 'Legal reasoning and legal culture : our "vision:" of law' (2005) 16 Stellenbosch
Law Review 3-20.
Ibid 16.
7 Ibid 16-17.
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While various factors have contributed to the proliferation of legislation and
proposed legislation governing intimate partnerships, by far and away the most
important factor contributing to the structure has been an obsession with
marriage as the only normative structure of an intimate relationship worthy of
recognition by the state.79 With the initial construct of marriage in place, the
decision to construct separate silos for different types of intimate partnerships
- once a contested space when contemplating the 'first silo' of the RCMA - has
now been taken for granted as the most suitable formso with the impending
passage of the Domestic Partnerships Bill and the Muslim Marriage Bill. These
separate silos are schizophrenic in nature: while purporting to expand
protection for intimate partnerships, the state will only do so if these
partnerships replicate the 'original' marriage, with concessions being made to
'culture' and 'religion' as determined by those in authority and with a 'voice'.81
What is the alternative? Perhaps it is time to consider crossing the divide
between matrimonial law and welfare law, and start looking at the way in which
welfare law in South Africa has expanded the meaning of family to incorporate
dependency and not form as a guiding principle. 82 Why not intimate
partnerships as well? In fact, as the Mayelane case exposes, the question of
remittal to the High Court to decide on formalities avoids the hard question of
whether the law adequately protects those in intimate partnerships, whatever
'name' we ascribe to the partnership. There are various options: an attractive
suggestion has been made that 'a single new measure can be enacted which
regulates the solemnization, consequences and dissolution of all types or forms
of recognized marriage in South Africa'. 83 While this suggestion will deal with
the plethora of legislation and Bills recognising different types of relationships,
it still places 'marriage' at its centre, and therefore potentially leaves women in
non-formalised intimate relationships out in the cold.84 A better suggestion, if
not more complex, would be to go back to the 'judicial discretion' model
originally proposed by the SALRC in relation to unregistered domestic
79 For instance, the Constitutional Court has been accused of adopting a 'constricted marriage
model' Meyerson, above n 26, at 312 and 'putting marriage on a pedestal', B Meyersfeld 'If
you can see, look: Domestic Partnerships and the Law' (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review
271 at 289. See also Lea Mwambene and Helen Kruuse 'Form over function? The practical
application of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 1998 in South Africa' (2013)
forthcoming in Acta Juridica.
s0 Yarbrough, above n 7, at 37.
81 Ibid 43. Another consequence of the current silo structure is the awkward and embarrassing
racialised character of various marriage options. This consequence is explored in Marius
Pieterse 'It's a Black Thing: Upholding culture and customary law in a society founded on
nonracialism' (2001) 17 South African Journal of Human Rights 364-391.
82 See, for instance, the South African Law Commission's White Paper for Social Welfare (1997)
which recognised that families take myriad forms: 'The social, religious and cultural diversity
of families are acknowledged as well as the effects of social change on the nature and structure
of families' and defined the family in its glossary as 'individuals who either by a contract or
agreement choose to live together intimately and function as a unit in a social and economic
system
83 IP Maithufi and GMB Moloi 'The need for the protection of rights of partners to invalid
marital relationships: A revisit of the "discarded spouse" debate' (2005) 38 De Jure 144 at 153.
84 Lea Mwambene and Helen Kruuse, above n 79.
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partnerships8 5 as a prototype for all intimate partnerships and leave 'marriage
per se' to the private domain. 86 This is a long-term project which no doubt has
vast practical difficulties, historical legacies and cultural and religious issues to
navigate. However, to stay on a trajectory that is bound to exacerbate divisions
cannot be the answer. Perhaps the crafters of the law should have considered
Chanock's remarks on the issue of customary marriages as far back as 1991
when he stated: 'defining a form of marriage is not really vital.'87 Given the
difficulties our courts have faced as a result of differing forms in differing
structures, is it not time we found a way to recognise and regulate important
intimate relationships without the baggage of marriage?88 As Chanock goes on
to say: 'we should concentrate on a family law system which embodies only
those necessary protections to those vulnerable in family relationships, thereby
abjuring cultural symbolism of any kind.'89
V POSTSCRIPT: A TALE OF TWO WIVES
On 30 May 2013, and after completion of this chapter, the Constitutional
Court handed down their decision in the case of Mayelane v Ngwenyama and
Another.90 Fortunately, the court decided against remittal to the High Court,
and heard evidence itself on the question (unrelated to the statutory question
decided in the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal) of whether Tsonga
customary law required the consent of the first wife in order for the second
marriage to be valid. The majority (three judges, with three concurring on a
different basis and three dissenting) found that the Tsonga law requires the first
wife be 'informed' about the second marriage (para 87). Given that
Ms Mayelane knew nothing of the second marriage, Ms Ngwenyama's
marriage was held to be invalid. The court further held that - going forward -
the lack of consent by the first wife in Tsonga customary marriage would
invalidate any further marriage. The court held that this development of
Tsonga customary law was 'in accordance with the demands of human dignity
and equality' set out in both the Constitution and the RCMA itself.
While the decision is to be applauded for its sensitivity to the first wife's rights
of dignity and equality, the decision raises two immediate areas of concern.
South African Law Reform Commission (Project 118) Report on Domestic Partnerships (2006)
366-367.
86 A good comparative investigation to consider would be the Law Commission of Canada's
report: Beyond Conjugality: Recognising and Supporting Close and Personal Adult Relationships
(2001). See discussions of this report in N Polikoff 'All Families Matter: What the Law Can Do
About It' (2004) 25 Women's Rights Law Reporter 205; and N Polikoff 'Ending Marriage as We
Know it' (2003-2004) 32 Ho/stra Law Review 201.
8 M Chanock 'Law, State and Culture: Thinking about "Customary Law" after Apartheid'
(1991) Acta Juridica 52 at 68.
P de Vos 'Time for a rethink on marriage, my China' available at http://
constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/ (accessed June 2013).
89 M Chanock 'Law, State and Culture: Thinking about "Customary Law" after Apartheid'
(1991) Acta Juridica 52 at 68.
90 CCT 57/12) [2013] ZACC 14.
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First, it revives what academics have described as 'the discarded wife debate',
being the rights of equality and dignity of the second wife. In this context,
equality becomes a much harder right to give substance to when there are three
(or more) parties involved. This gives way to a related concern: what if there are
more wives? Would the consent of the second and third wife be required for the
valid conclusion of subsequent marriages? The court expressly avoided this
question. In addition, would a first wife in another custom be required to go to
court to ask for the same consent development to apply in her custom?
Secondly, whether the decision will change current practice and force men to
request consent from their first wives is debatable, given the hold that cultural
elites have over the form and content of customary law marriages. In this
regard, Nkosi Patekile Holomisa recently responded to the court decision - in
his capacity as the President of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South
Africa (CONTRALESA) - as follows: 'It's going to force men to divorce and
marry again, which is not how it's done in African culture.' And further: '[t]here
is no limit to polygamy except being able to provide for the family.'91
Incidentally, CONTRALESA is the same organisation (which calls itself 'the
sole and authentic representative of the progressive traditional leadership of
South Africa') who submitted a proposal to the South African parliament in
2012 for the removal of the anti-discrimination clause against sexual
orientation in the Constitution. But that is a discussion for another day.
91 Available at www.legalbriefco.za/article.php?story=20130611120140758 (accessed June 2013).
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